

# “Planetary Nations – Charta Volume I”

by Thomas Guldenkirch

## **1. Abstract**

The model of government consists of a contractually regulated co-operation of the states of this world for the realisation of the aim to protect mankind from damage scenarios which are avoidable and work globally. The contract has a fixed content which was constructed in a way that

1. the contractual model of government can be initiated by two states and takes effect already from then on;
2. the contractual model of government can be accepted by all states around the world and can cause general willingness to ratify the contract;
3. the contractual model of government can be understood, approved and supported by all people around the world;
4. the contractual model of government offers as ideal framework conditions as possible so that the people living on earth can develop and realise good ideas for measures against the threats to life.
6. the contractual governmental action leads to the lowest possible consumption of additional resources;

The basic theory is that a contractually regulated co-operation of the states of this world seems to be possible if they are equal contractual partners, while the assumption that the states would be prepared for succumbing themselves to a superordinate authority would be illusory and would lead to nothing due to a lack of willingness to participate on the part of the states. A contractually regulated co-operation of the states definitely stood the test in the framework of the United Nations Charter if the situation is compared with a presumed situation without the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United Nations cannot be a platform for the necessary co-operation of the states due to many reasons which cannot be described in detail in this work.

The contract does not establish new institutions subordinated to the states or independent from the states since many states would not accept them.

The contract solves financial issues not in the form of a fixed budget of a new government apparatus, but in connection with the concrete measures which are determined by the member states. Many states would also not accept an abstract financial burden in favour of a new government apparatus.

The content of the contract is sophisticated and does not require further negotiations among the states on the planet.

The states can concentrate on the point, namely the finding of ideas for appropriate measures. The backgrounds and contents of the individual regulations are explained in more detail in the second part under the letter A. Furthermore, the second part contains the finished contract, which has a mainly self-explanatory content, under the letter B. In the third part, the demonstration in relation to the compliance with the evaluation criteria is started.

No theory can exist without definite assumptions. The theory of the contract is based on certain assumptions about the situation on earth and about the behaviour of states and people. These are:

- a. The life of the people on the planet is threatened by uncontrollable global threats. These include asteroid impacts and volcanic eruptions.
- b. The life of the people on the planet is as well threatened by controllable global threats. These include global warming, overpopulation and the use of weapons of mass destruction.
- c. For a long time to come, the world will still consist of different states. No state will abolish itself in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the natural members of a government for the protection of mankind against global controllable threats are the individual states.
- d. The states in the world will not develop a sense of acceptance for a subordinate government in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, currently a renaissance of the idea of the national state takes place.
- e. There will always be cases of regional armed conflicts, of regional human deprivation and of regional dictatorships. The community of states cannot avoid them in advance. The assumption that a prevention system for it could exist would be illusory. Therefore, it would be counterproductive to equip the contract with such higher objectives.
- f. No state will ever act against its own interests. The states' interests are dominated by egoistic ways of thinking. In the majority of cases it is about interests of domestic policy, economics, foreign policy and geostrategy. For the states, the protection against controllable global threats does not play a decisive role for action. Therefore, measures against controllable global threats are opposed to practically insurmountable egoistic national interests. Ideas can only be successful if, from the participating states' point of view the own advantages outweigh the own disadvantages in their realisation.
- g. Promising ideas against controllable global threats can emerge better under good framework conditions than under poor ones. However, they do not depend on specific political directions.
- h. The United Nations are not suitable as model of government for the development and realisation of promising ideas against controllable global threats. They are stuck in their outdated Charter and cannot be reformed to the necessary extent. They also cannot symbolise a new beginning, which is necessary to release the euphoria essential for the project.

- i. Nothing can be realised all over the world at one go. If the goal of globally effective measures is to be pursued, it is more important to choose a starting point that has a chance for steadily rising and finally ideally worldwide impact.
- j. The optimism that something can be reached on a voluntary basis just in time is more sensible than the pessimism that the states of this world are only then prepared to act when it is already too late.

## **2. Description of the model - finished contract**

### **2.A. Description of the model**

#### 2.A.1. Contract as form of coalition

The model of government that takes into account the assumptions stated under number 1. is based on a contract as voluntary coalition of different states.

An alternative to this contract does not exist. In the world, there is no monopoly on the use of force that could constrain a coalition of the different states on an involuntary basis. States trapped in an involuntary coalition would be demotivated to contribute to the success of the coalition anyway.

A state voluntarily participates in a contract only if it deems it favourable for itself. Only then, the rulers can make joining to the contract politically attractive in the individual states. Therefore, the general advantageousness is a decisive contractual element. The contract must under no circumstances lead to situations which the states will most likely or even only possibly regard as disadvantageous for them.

The submission to an international government or to an international court of justice and every other surrender or impairment of sovereign rights would be regarded as disadvantageous. Concession of every kind towards other states would also be regarded as disadvantageous. The acceptance of own disadvantages for the benefit of other states or for the benefit of a whole is currently politically not enforceable in the world. Nation-state thinking currently experiences a renaissance. The US is a good example for this. They want to exit the Paris Agreement because they regard the agreement as "bad deal" for the US.

That means that the own advantage of the individual states is always the centre of their consideration. This is true even though everybody knows about the existing dangers to mankind. A contract that is exclusively advantageous for all states is, therefore, decisive for the contract's success.

Therefore, the chosen model of government consists of a voluntary contractual coalition of the states which is exclusively advantageous for the member states.

## 2.A.2. Explanation of the characteristics of the contract

### 1. Basics:

It is decisive for a new contract that its content is chosen in a way that it can motivate the states worldwide to join the contract and to motivate the joined member states to participate actively. The whole content of the contract is aimed at the promotion of these motivations.

The contract's primary objective is to establish a model of government which offers the greatest possible chance that promising ideas against controllable global threats can be developed and realised. For this, the contract creates the ideal framework conditions.

### 2. Start and advancement of the contract:

The contract requires an easy start. It would be much too difficult to try to accomplish a contract among many states immediately. It is better to start small and to grow afterwards. Therefore, the contract starts as contract between two states. Preferably between two befriended states of international importance and with a great chance of acceptance in the respective population. For example, this could be France and Germany. Both states share a close friendship and the populations of both states are open to such a topic. It could just as well be two other states like for example Sweden and Norway. They share a friendship as well and have open-minded populations. That the contract can be initiated with only two states, leads to less implementation effort for the initiators. They have to present their model only to few governments. If they were able to persuade two states and if the contract was concluded between two states, the further development of the contract is, from the initiators' point of view, a sure-fire success.

The contract can be concluded between more than two states as well. But this is not necessary and that exactly makes the difference to a system that is based on a general founding act and is, therefore, much more difficult and more vulnerable to failure in the foundation phase than the contract presented here.

Immediately after the conclusion of the contract, the contracting states can start their work and all other states can join the contract by means of ratification and become member states. So that it is and remains random between which two states the contract was concluded at first, the two founding states must not have any advantages over the states joining the contract afterwards. They must be absolutely equal states. A contractual preference of the founding states, and be it only symbolically, would be an obstacle for all other states joining afterwards. However, it must not be overlooked that the initial conclusion of the contract could definitely be connected with political prestige in extracontractual respects for the two contracting states. This, in turn, could be a mainspring for their actions, however without "violating" other states by means of this. Other states could always bank on the contract's content which rules that there is no preference of the founding states.

So that it is easy for all states to sign the contract, it must not include any content that would give cause for renegotiations. Therefore, it is for example necessary that, right from the beginning, not the existence of weapons of mass destruction is formulated as threat but exclusively their use. A contract that is directed against the existence of weapons of mass destruction has no chance of being ratified by states that have such weapon systems and regard them as useful political instrument. On the other hand, a contract that intends to avoid that existing weapons of mass destruction be used to the

detriment of mankind has the chance of general support because no state owning weapons will say about itself that it wants to use its weapons of mass destruction against other states and their populations.

### 3. Short contract content:

The contract needs and has a content which is so short that it is self-explanatory or can at least be explained easily and, thus, be easily made accessible to the "normal" people in the individual states. Only with a content that is limited to essential elements, also the "normal" people can be "taken along" in the contract project. This did not happen with the Charter of the United Nations which consists of 111 articles. Probably hardly anyone knows their contents and people have at best a vague idea of what the contract is about in detail. By this means, it was not possible to establish a close relationship of the people to the contract's contents. Therefore, the proposed concrete contract only consists of a preamble and eight articles. It is obviously for everyone that no disadvantages at all, which could be an obstacle for states to join the contract, arise from the preamble and the eight articles.

The simple contract is therefore without more ado suitable that also individual population groups or whole populations of individual states can stand up towards their government for their nation joining and can accordingly exert pressure on their state governments. Furthermore, the contract has the quality to provide for additional so-called grassroots movements all over the world. This is, in turn, for the benefit of the contract within the meaning of a catalyst. Among other things, this is why the contract has, by means of the headlines, a very short and mostly self-explanatory content. Nothing else is necessary for a successful contract system.

### 4. Contractual result independent of the number of member states:

For the success of the contract it is not only decisive that the contract can be implemented by only two states, but also that the contract works, regardless the number of states joining the contract in any period of time, and that it can lead to the generation and realisation of ideas. The process of joining can be fast or slowly. Few, many or even all states of the world can join. All of this must not have any influence on whether the contract does work or not. It is surely desirable that all states of the world join the contract but it is not necessary for its success. As well it is not necessary that all joined states take part in all adopted measures. It is decisive that the result is a measurable improvement in total. On the other hand, ideal situations are illusory and neither a convincing contract model nor a convincing action plan.

### 5. Self-explanatory and finalised contract content:

The concrete content of the contract is available as further description of the model of government in the framework of this competition but also in the framework of the implementation with the states addressed by the initiators. It makes no sense to describe the contents of a contract only abstractly and to leave the elaboration of the description with concrete articles to the states' negotiation. That would not lead to a result in the foreseeable future. A finalised contract that the states will join without more ado is preferable.

### 6. Institutions and financing:

It is an important element of the contractual model of government that it does without new institutions that are independent of the states. No new instruments are created. The states act

themselves by using their existing state institutions and under the application of their existing state mechanisms for action. No state has to reinvent itself for the project. No state has to give its population an understanding of new institutions. Every state maintains its usual scheme of action. Only the special quality in the co-operation of the states is new. It is regulated by the contract and this organisation serves first and foremost for the finding and realisation of ideas since this alone is decisive for a success of mankind against controllable global threats.

Therefore, the contract only leads to the following institutions:

- General assembly of all member states;
- committee of states from five member states;
- Head of the committee of states.

The decision-making and control mechanisms are:

- Requests of the member states;
- resolutions of the member states;
- determinations of the committee of states.

The contract must also not build up financial barriers which could discourage other states from joining the contract. New and expensive administrative bodies will probably have few supporters in the states and their populations. There are already too many of them with an output that is regarded as too low. For example, many Europeans are annoyed by the payments for the maintenance of expensive administrative bodies of the European Union. The United Nations as well have the problem that their budget has, among others, to be financed by contributions of the member states and finally rely on the willingness to pay, particularly of the US, in order to be able to exist at all. Therefore, the contract follows another principle. No additional administrative apparatus shall be built up. The member states do not have to fear that they have to pay for such an apparatus in which already the allocation of different positions of the administrative apparatus can easily become an intrigue among the powerful. They act as member states with their own bodies which they have to provide either way. Conferences shall take place as cost-effective as possible and via video whenever this is possible. No conference building has to be built. The member states have to pay only in the framework of the measures decided and even then only if they agreed to the resolution during the vote. Thus, they are respectively free in what they accept as obligation and what they do not accept.

#### 7. Measures:

It is decisive for the contract's success that decisions on measures by the member states take place and that these resolutions will be put into practise. So that decisions on measures are taken and they are implemented, the democratic principle that the majority rules has to be left. No state would join the contract if the possibility would exist that it could be forced to certain measures by majorities which are formed by other states. No state that would be forced to certain measures by other states would participate in the implementation of the forced measures. For this reason, decisions on measures are only binding for those states that agreed to the resolution. There is no reason for agreeing states not to participate actively in the implementation of the resolution.

Measures have to be based on promising ideas. The generation of such ideas is a central task of the contract. Of course, ideas are especially good when they are suitable for motivating as many member

states as possible to agree and to participate. For this, they are suitable if they bring as many advantages as possible for the agreeing states. A system that could lead to such comprehensive advantages would be, for example, the system of trade facilitations among the agreeing states. The group of agreeing states could reach trade agreements among each other which are interesting for as many states as possible. In this way, trade agreements and decisions on measures could be combined and that, in turn, could attract many states.

In any case, quorate measures must exclusively be concrete actions and not the declaration of political goals like it has come into fashion at the moment and as it has been practised in the Paris Agreement with the so-called two-degree target. If already the wording of a goal is presented as political success and the negotiation about how to reach the goal is postponed to later and relocated to backrooms, either nothing or very few will move.

Additional to concrete actions, petitions and recommendations addressed to other states can be resolved as measures only in exceptional cases. That makes sense since an additional set of instruments is needed for the dealing with non-member states and non-agreeing states that can, at least, achieve more than nothing and is possibly suitable for the creation of atmosphere in the states concerned.

The opportunities for decision-making offered by the contract are final so that the member states can concentrate on the essentials.

#### 8. Actions in case of contract violations:

A contract must lead to legal consequences if it is violated by a member state. The installation of courts which are watching whether and in which way a member state violates the contract and which then could pass appropriate judgements on the member state, will probably not be accepted by the states. No state can be interested in succumbing itself to an international court and accepting its judgements directed against itself. Such a submission would be politically undesirable and not enforceable. The contract would not be ratified by many states. The model of government based on a contract is also not about judging states but about motivating the states to participate constructively. Therefore, the contract follows an alternative approach. Thereby, the contract provides for fairness towards contract violations because it contains an exclusion mechanism that becomes effective when a member state violates its duty of co-operation to a certain extent. The exclusion mechanism is self-organised and does not require a court. It is content with determinations which are to be made easily and according to objective criteria by means of the randomly staffed committee of states and which will, in case of certain violations that are detrimental to the contract, easily lead to the member states leaving the contract and, thus, being removed as destabilising powers. In the worst case, member states can behave passively or they can refuse decisions without being afraid of sanctions. However, they also cannot be forced to agree to proposed resolutions. Otherwise, this could again be an obstacle that could induce the states to refrain from a membership. The contract does not provide for another punishment than the exclusion from the contract and this is not necessary as well. On the one hand, the exclusion mechanism leads to condemnation of the states violating the contract by the world community; on the other hand, it is not a high obstacle for a membership because no state has to be afraid of anything else than the exclusion from the contract. All states of the world will probably be able to agree to this.

## 9. Competition among the states:

A feature of the contract that should not be underestimated is a sporting competition among the member states for the most promising ideas. This is inspired by the Olympic principle and is, therefore, easy to understand for all people. It must not be neglected that the people in the states are competitive in a sporting sense and hope for success of their state in international sports competitions because of their national pride. For this logic, the Olympic Games and the Football World Cup are only two examples among many. International sports competitions lead to whole populations celebrating the successes of their teams. For a long time already, politics has used the interest of the spectators during major international sports competitions for its own purposes. Politics also have an interest in their own states being successful in sporting competition with other states. The contract uses the principle of sporting competition for the purpose of finding ideas. The best model of government must not detract from the fact that creative people with good ideas who are able to change the world for the better are rare. An idea is always born in one single head. In contrast, a group cannot have one idea. At best, it can take them up and develop them further. In the vast majority of cases, the creative people who have the good ideas are not the ones who would have the power to implement their ideas. Their ideas are often not heard at all. Therefore, it is an elementary task of the contract to find these people, to give their ideas significance via the state competition system, in which states and politicians can bask themselves, and to help their ideas being implemented. It can be assumed that the member states will do much to be successful in the competition with other member states. They seek successes for the own population's pride. A success in the contractual competition system can be used politically and commercially as well, for example as evidence for the own successful education policy or as flagship in the tourism industry. Without the competition installed in the contract, the system of finding ideas would be drily and boring and, at best, a compulsory exercise for the different states. With the competition, however, the system obtains an additional strong emotional and political incentive for action.

## 10. Lot system:

The contractual lot system leading to the composition of the committee of states and the appointment of the chairperson is another important element. On the one hand, it ensures that no power politics of any kind can take place and that all member states have exactly the same chances. On the other hand, it provides for great excitement in every year. This excitement can be transferred to the individual member states and be used for the image of the contract system there. During large tombolas or other draws, the populations of the states sit in front of the TV entrancedly and watch the lots being drawn. Corresponding luck of the draw can make a state glad and proud. Member states chosen by chance are themselves very much interested in doing their job particularly well. We regularly experience similar situations in Europe. There, the presidency of the EU Council changes among the member states regularly every six months and it can be observed that the state that is currently presiding over the Council makes considerable efforts to provide a successful performance during the presidency which is based on the principle of chance. Every person and every state as well will, if he/she or it is in the spotlight, make a good impression. The contract tries to use this human characteristic as well for its own purpose.



#### 11. The number eight:

The contract was deliberately made up of exactly eight articles. In all world religions and cultures, the number eight has a fundamentally positive connotation and can, thus, from all sides be understood as something positive. Other numbers, for example the number ten, which is mainly connected with the Christian Ten Commandments and are regarded as paternalism by others, must be avoided.

#### 12. Name of the contract charta:

The contract charta has the name: "Planetary nations - Charta Volume I", a symbolism inspired by the United Nations. United Nations and Planetary Nations can stand next to each other. The same applies to the abbreviations "UN" and "PN". This emphasises the importance of the new Charta and can, at best, lead to the development of a euphoria among the acting persons which accelerates the process. The notion "planetary" stands for the objective to preserve the planet as living space for the nations (states). The combination of the name with a version number stands for the request to the world community to strive for continuous advancement and improvement. The version description with a Roman number is to emphasise the importance of the contract within the era of humanity. If the contract does not have the desired success, the world community is free to strive for a new volume II. It can never be the objective to sink into a state of resignation. This was to be demonstrated.

#### 13. Reach goals quickly:

It is important that the contract is easy. The world can be ruled not only in a complicated way but also in a very simple way. An intensive personal friendship between two powerful rulers can already be sufficient for changing many things in the world for the better. The idea of one single person can be sufficient for significantly changing the world. The contract which is kept particularly simple has the objective to emphasise this and not to allow any state to hide behind complicated contract mechanisms or to abuse them in tactical respects. Everything is regulated in a simple way and transparent for the world population. The principle of simplification has already reached many heads in the world and will probably encounter sympathy.

### **2.B. Finished contract**

#### **"Planetary Nations - Charta Volume I"**

##### **Preamble**

Our planet is the living space for many different nations. All nations, including the states representing them, are invited to play a part in contributing to the objective that mankind can survive on this planet and will not be extinguished or impaired by circumstances that could have been avoided. The human desire for being able to live is stronger than every other desire. Everyone should support the survival of mankind.

##### **Article 1      The contract and its member states**

- (1) This contract is concluded between the states [...] and [...]. The founding states do not have any advantages over the other member states.

- (2) All states acknowledged by the United Nations can join the contract. A state can join by means of declaration towards all existing member states for the attention of the chairperson of the committee of states according to section (5). The committee of states determines the joining by majority vote. By means of the determined joining, the states become member states and can make requests as well as participate in general assemblies.
- (3) States which are not acknowledged by the United Nations can join the contract if the general assembly approves the joining by majority vote. Thereby, political differences should play no role. In this case, the determination of joining is made by means of majority vote of the general assembly. By means of the determined joining, the states become member states and can make requests as well as participate in general assemblies.
- (4) Within one year, joined states have to declare which of the decision on measures already taken they accept and which they reject. The declaration and its determination is conducted as stated in section (2).
- (5) If more than five states have joined the contract, a committee of states consisting of five member states is built for respectively one year for the determinations according to the contract. The members and the chairperson of the committee are determined by lot in the general assembly. Until then, the existing member states form the committee of states with a chairperson who is determined by lot every year in the general assembly.
- (6) Member states can withdraw from the contract. The withdrawal is made by means of declaration. The declaration and its determination are conducted as stated in section (2). Through the withdrawal, the states lose their status as member state as well as the entitlements they acquired by means of their membership. They can neither make requests nor participate in general assemblies anymore. In connection with their withdrawal, the withdrawing member states have to state whether or not they continue to adhere to their financial commitments made by means of accepting resolutions.

## **Article 2      Assemblies and votes**

- (1) The general assembly is the meeting of all member states. The constituting general assembly takes place in [...] on [...]. The assembly is chaired by [...]. The following general assemblies take place upon invitation of the chairperson of the committee of states under his leadership. The chairperson decides on the time of the assembly. The invitation period shall be at least three months. General assemblies are open to the public. The member states shall appoint representatives for the assembly who are entitled to vote and to send them to the vote. The general assemblies shall be held as resource-efficient as possible and, if feasible, without personal meetings. The committee of states decides on the mode of assembly that appears suitable by majority vote. The decision on the mode of assembly remains valid until a new decision is made.

- (2) The assembly of the committee of states shall take place for the first time in the first general assembly and afterwards every three months upon invitation and under the leadership of the chairperson. The chairperson decides upon the exact time of the assembly. The invitation period shall be at least one month. The assemblies are open to the public. The member states shall appoint representatives for the assembly who are entitled to vote and to send them to the vote. The state committee decides on the mode of assembly that appears suitable by majority vote. The decision on the mode of assembly remains valid until a new decision is made.
- (3) Every member state has respectively one vote in votes of the general assembly and in votes of the assembly of the committee of states. The respectively necessary majority is not determined by the number of member states present in the respective assembly but by the total number of member states entitled to vote. Abstentions during the vote are evaluated as rejection.

### **Article 3 Objective of the contract and decisions on measures**

- (1) It is the objective of the contract to save mankind or a part of mankind from extinction or existential deterioration of their living conditions by means of controllable global threats.
- (2) Controllable global threats are:
  - a. Global warming
  - b. Overpopulation
  - c. Use of weapons of mass destruction
- (3) The member states can change the contract upon request of one member state and particularly delete some of the threats mentioned in section (2) or add other ones. The general assembly decides upon changes. A four-fifths majority is necessary for a change to the contract.
- (4) All member states resolve on measures for avoiding the extinction or existential deterioration of living conditions by means of controllable global threats. Measures are concrete actions of the member states. No measures are objectives or intentions of the member states.
- (5) In exceptional cases, petitions and recommendations addressed to other states are considered as measures in the above-mentioned sense.
- (6) All member states shall try to develop as many and as promising requests for measures as possible.

### **Article 4 Request for decision on measures**

- (1) Every member state can request a measure it considers suitable.

- (2) Every request shall contain a proposal for common financing of the measure by means of the agreeing member states if an independent financing by the individual agreeing member states seems to be excluded. The financing proposal shall comment on the management of financial means as well and take into account the possible joining of other states to the contract with declaration of agreement to the resolution.
- (3) Several member states can make joint requests. Joint requests are classified for every member state participating in the application according to Article 7.
- (4) The request shall be transmitted to the committee of states for the attention of the chairperson. The committee of states determines the admissibility of the request by majority vote exclusively according to the following criteria:
  - Basic suitability for the realisation of contractual objectives;
  - No intention to discriminate against other states.
- (5) Admissible requests shall be transmitted to all other member states by the chairperson of the committee of states.

**Article 5 Realisation of decisions on measures**

- (1) The general assembly decides upon admissible requests by majority vote. The vote shall take place at the earliest six months and at the latest twelve months after transmission of the request.
- (2) All member states that agreed to the resolution that came into existence are obliged to transfer the resolution into national law within six months and to implement it within six further months.
- (3) Member states that did not agree to the resolution are neither obliged to transfer the resolution into national law nor to implement it. The resolution does not apply to them.

**Article 6 Contract violations**

- (1) If a member state violates its obligation to transfer a resolution which it has agreed to into national law and/or to implement it in case of several resolutions, it is excluded from the contract and loses its entitlements acquired by resolutions that have come into existence as soon as this has been determined by the committee of states according to section (4) sentence 2.
- (2) The committee of states determines upon request of a member state whether a member state violates its obligation to transfer a resolution that it agreed to into national law and/or to implement it. The determination is made by majority vote exclusively after objective criteria that became known.
- (3) The committee of states determines upon request of a member state that a case of violation identified according to section (2) has been eliminated. The determination is made by majority vote exclusively after objective criteria that became known.

- (4) The offence for exclusion according to section (1) is fulfilled if at least two cases of violation according to section (2) and (3) have been determined that have not been eliminated. The exclusion shall be determined by the committee of states with majority vote.
- (5) If a member state violates its obligation to participate in the general assembly twice in succession, it is excluded from the contract and loses its entitlements acquired by resolutions that have come into existence as soon as this has been determined by the committee of states according to section (6).
- (6) The committee of states determines with majority vote which member states did not participate in the general assembly twice in succession and have therefore been excluded.
- (7) Excluded member states can join the contract again after a waiting period of 3 years has expired. Joinings that have been repeated several times are not permissible.

**Article 7 Honours of member states**

- (1) As soon as at least ten states joined the contract, a continuous competition among the member states takes place on the question which are the most successful member states.
- (2) Every proposed resolution of a member state is weighted for the competition. If it seems suitable to contribute much to the achievement of the contract's objectives, it receives 3 points. If it is to this effect mediocre, it receives 2 points. If it seems suitable to contribute only little to the achievement of the contract's objectives, it receives 1 point. The committee of states decides on the award of points with majority vote. Its decision is binding for future committees of states.
- (3) The member states are being evaluated on an annual basis for the past year according to how many points they have collected with resolutions that have come into existence until now. The leading member state is allowed to carry the title "Planetary Nations winner of the gold medal" until the next evaluation. The second-best member state is allowed to carry the title "Planetary Nations winner of the silver medal". The third-best member state is allowed to carry the title "Planetary Nations winner of the bronze medal". The titles are newly awarded on an annual basis. Former winners can keep their titles by stating the year. Members withdrawn according to Article 6 lose their titles.

**Article 8 Name of the contract charta**

- (1) The contract charta carries the name "Planetary Nations - Charta Volume I". The abbreviation is "PN".
- (2) Significant advancements of the contract can be described with an ascending version number.

### **3. Argumentation demonstrating how the model meets assessment criteria**

The model of government founded by a contract fulfils the evaluation criteria.

#### **3.1 Core Values**

Via the contract's content, the model of government ensures that the decisions and measures serve the welfare of mankind and are guided by the respect towards the equality of all people. In detail, this is ensured by the following components:

1. No state is excluded from becoming a member. All states already acknowledged by the United Nations can participate (compare to Article 1 section (2)) and for other states, the barrier to join is low (compare to Article 1 section (3)). The contract has an absolutely apolitical content that makes the membership easy for every state. By means of this, it is assured that the model of government can reach all people in the world as equal beings.
2. There is no ranking between the member states. Every member state has the same rights and obligations. This as well shows the equality of all people in the world.
3. The committee of states responsible for determinations in terms of the contract as well as its chairperson are determined on an annual basis and exclusively by lot (compare to Article 1 section (5)). This ensures that the selection of member states for the committee of states as well as of its chairperson cannot be controlled by individual or group interests. This is the decisive condition for reaching objectivity towards all states and all people. Only objectivity towards all states and people leads to their equality.
4. The contract's objectives are clearly defined and serve, according to the definition, only the welfare of mankind (compare to Article 3 section (1) and section (2)).
5. For the admissibility of requests for measures for the achievement of objectives, exclusively the following both objective criteria are decisive:
  - Basic suitability for the realisation of contractual objectives;
  - No intention to discriminate against other states(compare to Article 3 section (4)). By means of this, it is ensured in a central way that requests not serving for the welfare of mankind cannot be used for the passing of resolutions.
6. The general assembly decides on admissible requests by simple majority of the member states entitled to vote (compare to Article 2 section (3) and Article 5 section (1)). By means of this, it is ensured that blockades by individual member states directed to the safeguarding of individual interests and, thus, against the welfare of the community cannot exist.
7. The majority of the general assembly does not decide on the fate of the member states not agreeing to the resolution (compare to Article 5 section (3)). By means of this, it is ensured that there is no paternalism of individual member states or of the people living in them. It is as well not the task of this contract, which has a special and limited objective,

to remove existing patronising or discriminating situations within the member states. This is the autonomous task of the individual states. Furthermore, it is not the intention of the contract to exclude states with patronising or discriminating situations from becoming member states. This would remove a mutually possible acceptance of the contract and, therefore, would not help the persons concerned as well.

### 3.2. Decision-Making Capacity

The contract and particularly the resolution system do not lead to jamming but is, on the contrary, able to make decisions. The implementation of resolved measures is also exactly regulated. How effectively the individual states are in implementing the resolved measures must not be a subject matter of the contract since this would result in paternalism which would not be accepted by the states and would keep the states from a membership that should always be preferred.

In detail, the efficiency of decision-making is ensured by the following components:

1. By a simple system for requests (compare to Article 4). It offers an uncomplicated way on which the states can achieve decisions on measures quickly and easily.
2. By a mechanism of majority decision (compare to Article 5 section (1)). It offers the opportunity that for resolutions on measures coming into existence neither a unanimous vote nor a very dominant majority is necessary among the member states. A simple majority of the member states entitled to vote is already sufficient for positively resolving a request. That member states not agreeing to the request are not forced to implement the resolution is connected with this (compare to Article 5 section (3)). By means of this, it is ensured that the votes about proposed resolutions do not lead to disputes among the member states. Those who do not regard a proposed measure as expedient for themselves, simply do not need to participate in the measure. This promotes the willingness to vote.
3. By a term mechanism which ensures that admissible requests shall be decided on within a term of 6 to 12 months (compare to Article 5 section (1)) and another term mechanism that ensures that the agreeing member states have to transfer resolved measures to national law within a term of 6 months and implement them within national law within six further months (compare to Article 5 section (2)).
4. By a competition mechanism among the member states that is to motivate the member states to requests for resolutions (compare to Article 7).
5. Finally, as well by the fact that the contract does not establish high barriers to joining for the states in the world so that it is ensured that many states participate in the contract and can make efforts for useful resolutions on measures.

### 3.3. Effectiveness

The system of government represented by the contract is able to manage the controllable global threats to mankind and as well to provide for the allocation of resources necessary for it. Thereby it must not be ignored that the quality of the system significantly depends on the quality of people's ideas for resolutions on measures. No model of government is good if there are no ideas as to which measures could effectively help the planet. The creation of excellent framework conditions for the

development and implementation of good ideas to this effect is one main task of the contract. Thereby, the implementation of good ideas to this effect can be very expensive, but it does not have to. Therefore, it is not necessary to feed an apparatus that is independent of the individual ideas with money beforehand but the financing of the implementation of resolved measures can be resolved from case to case, namely only to that extent to which this is respectively useful and acceptable for the member states. Excessive financing requirements to individual member states would only lead to them rejecting the proposed resolution and, therefore, losing them as financing states.

Furthermore, the management of controllable global threats is ensured particularly by the following components:

1. By the contract's purpose that is focused on this objective and kept clear of other also aspirational objectives (compare to Article 3).
2. By the simple and unproblematic opportunity to participate for all states in the world (compare to Article 1).
3. By the simple mechanisms in order to reach measures against the threats to be combated (compare to Article 4 and Article 5).
4. By the regulated necessity of making a financing proposal the subject of a request for a measure (compare to Article 4 section (2)).
5. By a system of realisation and punishment that is exclusively directed at the promotion of the management system's effectiveness (compare to Article 5 and Article 6).

#### 3.4. Resources and Financing

The contract ensures in many ways that sufficient human and material resources as well as a fair financing exist. This particularly happens by the following components:

1. The member states act with the human and material resources already available for them. Additional human or material resources do not need to be organised. For example, the respective foreign ministry of the different member states or one of their other ministries or one of their other existing high representatives or officials could accomplish the participation in the contractual system of government (compare as well to Article 2 section (1) and section (2)).
2. The contract specifies that the general assemblies shall be held as resource-effective as possible and, if feasible, without personal meetings (compare to Article 2 section (1)). This mainly addresses the opportunities of video or internet conferences. However, more detailed regulations are out of question because particularly also the technical development in this area cannot be anticipated. This is why a separate decision shall be made upon the respective mode (compare to Article 2 section (1)).
3. The contract regulates that an appropriate financing proposal belongs to a request on measures (compare to Article 4 section (2)). By means of this, it is ensured that there is a respectively sensible decision on individual financing which accompanies the respective resolution on measures and supports the measure. The financing proposal



can, for example, comprise that richer member states participate more in the financing than poorer member states and that the requesting member state provides for the management of financial means and another member state can control this. Insofar there are no limits to creative approaches. This is also necessary since the individual ideas for measures can be diverse and cause very different financial needs.

### 3.5. Trust and Insight

From the beginning, the contract does without power structures so that the questions concerning their transparency does not come up at all. Power structures would mean that one member state would have the power over another member state or an institution would have the power over a member state. However, this must absolutely be avoided since the states of the world would otherwise not join the contract. As well the committee of states according to Article 1 section (5) does not have power but is exclusively responsible for preconfigured determinations. The same applies to its chairperson whose power is limited to sending invitations to general assemblies and assemblies of the committee of states and to chair the assemblies. The fact that the committee of states is newly filled every year and according to a random selection contributes to powerlessness.

The insight into decision-making is ensured due to the fact that the general assemblies and the assemblies of the committee of states are open to the public and that no decision-making paths are possible outside the public meetings (compare to Article 2 section (1) and section (2)).

### 3.6. Flexibility

The contract allows to be revised and improved without more ado, it even motivates the member states to do this since mankind must never reduce its efforts to recognise dangers and to find the best methods to cope with the dangers. In the contract, the opportunity of revision and improvement is fixed particularly with the following components:

1. The contract and especially the threat scenarios can be changed by the member states at any time (compare to Article 3 section (3)).
2. The change does not require a unanimous vote but "only" a majority of 4/5 of the member states entitled to vote (compare to Article 3 section (3)). By means of this form of majority, it is ensured that the member states cannot be put under pressure by one individual or by two allied member states. Insofar, the majority can really dominate. This, however, does not lead to an obstacle for joining because the individual member states rejecting the changes still have the opportunity to reject resolutions in the votes about on that score measures (compare to Article 5 section (3)).
3. It is immanent to the nature of resolutions on measures against the contractual threats that the contract does not give the answer to threats but the resolved measures. The requests for resolutions on measures can, therefore, always orientate themselves towards the current situation and the current needs.
4. The contract calls the existing charta expressly by the name "Volume I" and thereby encourages all people not to lose sight of the striving for an improved version (compare to Article 8).

### 3.7. Protection against the Abuse of Power

The contract does not include a special mechanism for the protection against abuse of power because it renounces right from the beginning to install power structures and instead makes it clear that it is not about power but about the best ideas in the fight against controllable global threats.

However, the contract still contains structures that avoid every, even unintentional, development of power. This particularly includes the following components:

1. The equality of all member states (also compare to Article 1 section (1) and Article 2 section (3)).
2. The composition of the committee of states and the appointment of its chairperson by lot and the limitation of the term of office of the committee of states to one year (compare to Article 1 section (5)).
3. The majority ratios sufficient for the votes which avoid the development of power via destructive voting behaviours of the different member states (compare to Article 3 section (3); Article 4 section (4); Article 5 section (1); Article 6 and Article 7).
4. The contract violation mechanisms that can lead to member states being excluded and, therefore, avoid the development of power by means of destructive contract behaviours of the different member states (compare to Article 6).

### 3.8. Accountability

The form of government based on the contract can hold the individual member states responsible for their actions in the sense that the contract leads to the exclusion of member states which do not adhere to resolutions to which they have agreed themselves and/or which do not participate in the general assemblies and, thus, thwart the realisation of majority decisions according to the number of member states entitled to vote (compare to Article 6). More accountability of the individual member states is not necessary and would be too great an obstacle for joining. The contract does not live on the accountability of individual member states but on the quality of and the ability to agree to ideas carrying the requests for resolutions on measures. These ideas should preferably establish reward systems for the participating states and no separate accountability systems for the participating states. A contract that would have the objective of an accountability of individual states beyond the opportunity of exclusion, would not have a chance of approval and would, therefore, be worthless.

A special accountability of the committee of states is not necessary as well since its capabilities are so limited either way that the question about accountability does not arise.

The contract does not cover the accountability of states but their constructive way in the search of the best opportunities to deal with the dangers for mankind in a sensible way.